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Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Age
Abstract
Political communications scholars, members of the press, and political elites have traditionally distinguished
between entertainment and non-entertainment media. It is in public affairs media in general and news media
in particular that politics is assumed to reside, and it is to this part of the media that the public is assumed to
turn when engaging the political world. Politics, in this view, is a distinct and self-contained part of public life,
and citizen is one role among many played by individuals. As a former network television executive put it, in
the civic education of the American public, entertainment programming is recess.
But people, politics, and the media are far more complex than this. Individuals are simultaneously citizens,
consumers, audiences, family members, workers, and so forth. Politics is built on deep-seated cultural values
and beliefs that are imbedded in the seemingly nonpolitical aspects of public and private life. Entertainment
media often provide factual information, stimulate social and political debate, and critique government, while
public affairs media are all too often diversionary, contextless, and politically irrelevant.
In this chapter we build upon the premises contained in the opening quote from Edelman: that politics is
largely a mediated experience; that political attitudes and actions result from the interpretation of new
information through the lenses of previously held assumptions and beliefs; and that these lenses are socially
constructed from a range of shared cultural sources. We also agree with Edelman that this has always been the
case, and so to the extent that researchers have ignored or downplayed entertainment media, popular culture,
art, and so forth, in the construction of both news and public opinion, we have missed a critical component of
this process.
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Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the
New Media Environment
Michael X. Delli Carpini and Bruce A. Williams
Political beliefu and actions spring from assumptions,
biases, and news reports. In this critical sense politics
is a drama taking place in an assumed and reported
world that evokes threats and hopes, a world people do
not directly observe or touch.... The models, scenar-
ios, narratives, and images into which audiences for
political news translate that news are social capital, not
individual inventions. They come from works of art in
all genres: novels, paintings, stories, films, dramas, tele-
vision sitcoms, striking rumors, even memorable jokes.
For each type of news report there is likely to be a small
set of striking images that are influential with large
numbers of people, both spectators of the political
scene and policymakers themselves.
Murray Edelman, From Art to Politics (p. 1)
We are living in an era where the wall between news
and entertainment has been eaten away like the carti-
lage of David Crosby's septum.
Al Franken, Chief Political Correspondent,
Comedy Central
Political communications scholars, members of the press, and political
elites have traditionally distinguished between entertainment and
nonentertainment media. It is in public affairs media in general and
news media in particular that politics is assumed to reside, and it is to
this part of the media that the public is assumed to turn when engag-
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ing the political world. Politics, in this view, is a distinct and self-
contained part of public life, and citizen is one role among many played
by individuals. As a former network television executive put it, in the
civic education of the American public, entertainment programming is
recess.
But people, politics, and the media are far more complex than this.
Individuals are simultaneously citizens, consumers, audiences, family
memhers, workers, and so forth.! Politics is built on deep-seated cul-
tural values and beliefs that are imbedded in the seemingly nonpoliti-
cal aspects of public and private life. Entertainment media often provide
factual information, stimulate social and political debate, and critique
government, while public affairs media are all too often diversionary,
contextless, and politically irrelevant.
In this chapter we bnild upon the premises contained in the opening
quote from Edelman: that politics is largely a mediated experience; that
political attitudes and actions result from the interpretation of new
information through the lenses of previously held assumptions and
beliefs; and that these lenses are socially constructed from a range of
shared cultural sources. We also agree with Edelman that this has always
been the case, and so to the extent that researchers have ignored or
downplayed entertainment media, popular culture, art, and so forth, in
the construction of both news and public opinion, we have missed a
critical component of this process.2
But we further argue that this omission is not a coincidence. Rather
it has been supported by a set of understandable but ultimately artifi-
cial structures and practices of the media, academic researchers, and
political elites that distinguish fact from opinion, public affairs from
popular culture, news from nonnews, and citizens/consumers from
experts/producers. These walls - in place throughout most of this
century - are rapidly eroding, the result of changing communications
technologies, the new economics of mass media, and broader cultural
trends. This erosion not only makes more obvious the political signifi-
cance of popular culture in the social construction and interpretation
of the news, but also makes the very distinction between news and
nonnews increasingly untenable. The resulting media enviromnent is
rearranging traditional power relationships as the authority of journal-
ists, public officials, and other political gatekeepers is increasingly chal-
lenged by other producers of political and social meaning - including
the public itself.
To explore these issues, we first critically analyze the distinction
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between public affairs and entertainment media, the way this distinc-
tion has become reified, and the reasons for its recent erosion. Media
coverage of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal (and its precursors) provide
us with a rich example of this erosion, and of the new power struggle
over defining and framing the public agenda that it has unleashed. We
conclude by discussing the role of the public in this new media envi-
ronment, suggesting that while traditional gatekeepers have lost much
of their agenda-setting authority, it is unclear who, if anyone, has taken
their place.
THE INHERENT ARBITRARINESS OF THE NEWS -
ENTERTAINMENT DISTINCTION
Despite the seeming naturalness of the distinction between news and
entertainment media, it is remarkably difficult to identify the charac-
teristics upon which this distinction is based. In fact, it is difficult - we
would argue impossible - to articulate a theoretically useful definition
of this distinction. The opposite of news is not entertainment, as the
news is often diversionary or amusing (the definition of entertainment)
and what is called "entertainment" is often neither. One might instead
use the terms public affairs media and popular media, but these dis-
tinctions also collapse under the slightest scrutiny. Does the definition
of public affairs media require that it be unpopular? Does the broad-
casting of a presidential address shift from public affairs to popular
media because it is watched by too many people? And how does one
classify the many magazine stories, novels, movies, television shows -
in all their rapidly changing formats such as melodramas, docudramas,
docusoaps, and talk shows - that address issues of public concern?
Clearly the concept of popular media does not provide a counterpoint
to public affairs. To the contrary, the "public" in public affairs indicates
that the issues discussed are of importance to a substantial segment of
the citizenry, and most of what is studied under this heading is popular
by any reasonable definition of the term.
The difficulty in even naming the categories upon which we base so
fundamental a distinction is more than semantics. Rather it highlights
the artificiality of this distinction. A more fruitful approach might be
to identify the key characteristics that are assumed to distinguish polit-
ically relevant from politically irrelevant media. But this does more to
blur than clarify the traditional news/nonnews categories. Public affairs
162
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media address real-world issues of relevance to a significant percentage
of the citizenry, but so, too, does much of what traditionally falls outside
of this genre: one would be hard pressed to find any substantive topic
covered in the news that has not also been the subject of ostensibly
nonnews .media. And public affairs media generally, and the news
more specifically, regularly address issues of culture, celebrity, and
personality.
Attempting to define public affairs media in broader strokes also does
litde to resolve this conceptual dilemma. Walter Lippmann defined
news as "the signalizing of an event" (Lippmann 1922). And yet enter-
tainment media often play this role, drawing the public's attention to
issues and events of social and political import (Delli Carpini and
Williams 1994a; Fiske 1996). In short, all of the usual characteristics we
associate with news or public affairs media can be found in other media,
and those we associate with popular or entertainment media can be
found in the news. We do not conclude from this that all media are
equally relevant to politics or useful to democratic discourse. Rather we
suggest that our traditional categories fail as a way of making such dis-
tinctions; that they are social constructions that tell us more about the
distribution of political power than about the political relevance of dif-
ferent genres. Further, we argue that these categories are rapidly losing
what power they once had to privilege certain gatekeepers and genres
in the process of constructing political reality. Before exploriug the
implications ofthis changing media environment, however, it is instruc-
tive to examine how the current categories emerged and were sup-
ported, and why they have been eroding in recent years.
THE "WALLING OFF" OF NEWS AND THE CREATION OF
AN INFORMATION ELITE
The now familiar distinction between news and entertainment can be
traced in large part to the first several decades of the twentieth century,
when economic, technological, political, and sociocultural changes
redefined the roles of the mass media, citizens, and elites.' Growing cen-
tralization of ownership and decreasing competition in the printed
press, coupled with the rise of an inherendy centralized and expensive
electronic media, threatened one of the presumed requisites of liberal
democracy: a diverse marketplace of ideas. At the same time, the eco-
nomics and politics of American life were becoming increasingly
[63
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nationalized (Lears 1983; Hanson 1985). In this centralized and nation-
alized environment, inherent tensions between the economic, enter-
tainment, and civic goals of the media became increasingly difficult to
ignore (Peterson 1956).
Adding to this sense of unease, social science research and real-world
events in Europe and the United States throughout the first half of the
twentieth century raised concerns regarding the stability of democratic
systems and the civic capacity of democratic citizens (Berelson 1952;
Schumpeter 1942). The public was increasingly seen as an inchoate, dis-
engaged mass that was susceptible to manipulation by the media and
that required protection from the media's propagandizing power
(Lippmann 1925).
Concerns about the proper role of both the media and citizens led
to greater emphasis on the role of experts, an emphasis that was part
of broader attempts to distinguish elites from the masses in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Progressive Era efforts to define
government as the province of specially trained experts rather than
easily corrupted elected officials or ignorant citizens have been well-
chronicled. In a similar vein, Levine (1988) describes the ways in which
dramatic changes in American society during the Progressive Era -
industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and so forth - challenged
existing cultural, social, and political definitions of what it meant to be
American. In response, elites in a wide range of cultural arenas - theater,
literature, museums, musical performance - sought to impose and
protect their own definitions of American identity by developing aes-
thetic standards, rules of audience behavior, canons of"meritorious" art
and literature, and other practices that constructed a new distinction
between elite and mass audiences. The result was the elevation and cel-
ebration of that which was enjoyed by elites and a parallel devaluation
of "the popular."
Driven in large part by the technological, economic, and cultural
changes just discussed, three conceptual distinctions of importance to
current theorizing about the media had emerged by the second half of
this century. First, the news media were separated from entertainment
media, with the former viewed as most directly responsible for fulfill-
ing the media's civic function. Second, within the news media, fact
became distinguished from opinion, and news reporting increasingly
strove to be accurate, objective, and balanced (ostensibly obviating the
need for a decentralized, competitive press). And third, the public was
distinguished from media professionals and policy experts, with the
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former viewed as passive, easily manipulated consumers of information,
and the latter as information gatekeepers who took primary responsi-
bility for determining and representing the public interest.
These distinctions were maintained through a set of institutional
structures. and processes:4
The division of media organizations into separate news and enter-
tainment divisions
The assumption that public affairs programing would be free from
(or less tied to) expectations of profitability
Trade distinctions between news and entertainment media
The physical layout and labeling of segments of publications and
programs so as to distinguish news from analysis or opinion, and
"hard" news from "soft" news or features
The routinization of program schedules (e.g., local news in the
early evening followed immediately by national news; local news
again at 10 or 11 PM; political talk shows on Sunday mornings)
The professionalization of journalists
The development of formal and informal standard operating pro-
cedures to assist in determining newsworthiness
The limited number of television stations available to citizens (from one
to five from the 1950s through at least the early 1980s), most or all
of which broadcast news at the same time, also reinforced the news~
entertainment distinction.
Distinctions between public affairs and popular media were also
maintained by the nature of their respective audiences. Readers of
prestige news magazines and newspapers and viewers of public
affairs broadcasting were a self-selected segment of the population - a
more elite social, economic, and political strata of citizens. This elite
audience signaled the serious nature of what was being read or watched,
distinguishing it from popular media. As with the distinction between
high brow and low brow culture (Levine 1988), the politically signifi-
cant and insignificant were defined as much by the organization of
producing institutions and the makeup of the audience as by actual
content.
In sum, the structural walling off of news from nonnews reified what
was essentially a socially constructed distinction. As Schudson notes, the
ideal of objective, professional journalists emerged "precisely when the
impossibility of overcoming subjectivity in presenting the news was
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widely accepted and ... precisely because subjectivity had come to be
regarded as inevitable" (1978, p. 157; emphasis added). Readers and
viewers were signaled that something was news because it was on the
evening news or the front page of the newspaper and that something
was opinion because it appeared on the opinion page or was labeled as
such on the evening news. Likewise, the nonpolitical was defined in part
by where and when it appeared, how it was labeled, who presented it,
and who attended to it.
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
NEWS-ENTERTAINMENT DISTINCTION
The media environment in the United States has changed dramatically
in the last fifteen years, spurred in part by the proliferation ofVCRs and
remote television controls, the availability of cable and satellite televi-
sion, the growth of the Internet and World Wide Web, the horizontal
and vertical integration of the media through conglomerates, and so
forth. These changes have dramatically increased the amount and range
of information that is readily available, the speed with which it becomes
available, and the opportunities for interactive mass communications
(Abramson et al. 1988). They are also leading to a convergence (or at
least blurring) of types of media, ownership of media, and media
genres.
This new media environment is a hostile one for maintaining the
always fragile distinction between public affairs and entertainment.
The division of media organizations into separate news, entertainment,
and sports divisions, while still in place, has become more porous,
and thus journalists, management executives, public officials, and
entertainers can develop celebrity identities that transcend any specific
job description and allow them to move freely between both types
of media and decreasingly distinct genres. In turn, the distinction
between fact and opinion or analysis is much less clearly identified
by simple rules such as where it appears, who is saying it, or how
it is labeled. Public affairs time slots have become overwhelmed by the
range of options open to citizens: Traditional news can be gotten any
time of the day through cable or the Web, or equally ignored at any
time of the day. Even the standard operating procedures, routines, and
beats that determined newsworthiness have become subject to recon-
sideration both from within and outside the journalistic profession
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(Rosen 1999). As audiences themselves absorb these changes and the
resulting erosion of formerly commonsense distinctions, they too begin
to move freely among media and genres (Delli Carpini and Williams
1994b).
Economic changes, many of which are the direct result of this new
media environment, have further eroded the news-entertainment dis-
tinction. News divisions, once accepted as the industry's concession to
the public good, are increasingly seen as potential sources of revenue.
The downsizing of news organizations makes it increasingly difficult to
perform their journalistic function with the same degree of care as in
the past. Many of the federal regulations designed to assure at least a
minimal amount of public affairs broadcasting and some degree of fair-
ness and access have been dismantled or allowed to go unenforced. The
growing centralization of the media into a handful of international
communications conglomerates with interests in film, music, cable, and
broadcast television increases the pressure for profit and further blur
the line between news and entertainment (Bagdikian 1992).
In short, the new media are creating an environment that is increas-
ingly incompatible with the structures and practices that maintained
the news-entertainment distinction for most of this century. As these
walls crumble, the form and content of news and entertainment come
to resemble each other more closely, laying bare what has always been
a socially constructed distinction.5 What is clear is that this new media
environment presents a direct chaHenge to the authority of elites - jour-
nalists, policy experts, public officials, academics, and the like - who
served as gatekeepers under the old system. Less clear is to whom, if
anyone, this authority has shifted. To some extent it is returning to the
public, as they playa more active role in constructing social and polit-
ical meaning out of the mix of mediated narratives with which they are
presented. At the same time, there is evidence that new or marginalized
groups, along with new or formerly nonpolitical media, are playing a
more central role in setting and framing the public agenda. And,
keeping in mind the first several decades of this century, it is quite pos-
sible that traditional media and political elites will emerge from the
current period of flux having reasserted their gatekeeping role in some
new form. In the next section we illustrate the blurring line between
entertainment and news, and its complex impact on the agenda-setting
process, by closely examining media coverage of the Lewinsky-Clinton
spectacle.6
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SEX, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPES: A CASE STUDY OF THE
NEW MEDIA POLITICS
In mid-January 1992 The Star, a national tabloid specializing in stories
about the personal lives of celebrities, published a story in which Gen-
nifer Flowers claimed to have had a twelve-year affair with Bill Clinton,
then the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination for president of
the United States. The story was initially downplayed in the mainstream
press, in part because the allegations were two years old. It was also
initially ignored because the Star, described in one mainstream
newspaper article as better than most of the national tabloids, but still
a step below the National Enquirer, was deemed an unreliable news
source.7
The decision by Bill and Hillary Clinton to directly address the issue
by appearing on 60 Minutes (a choice based in part because the show
would air immediately following the Super Bowl) brought the issue
more centrally into the mainstream press. The Clintons, who helped
perfect the art of using the nontraditional press, also appeared on shows
like Prime Time Live, Donahue, The Arsenio Hall Show, and MTVeither
to directly refute or to deflect the issue. While the Clintons' efforts were
successful in rallying public support and partially diffusing the issue,
the alleged affair had gained some legitimacy within the mainstream
press as a campaign issue - members of the press could point to the
existence of legitimate sources (for example, the Clintons themselves)
and to the fact that other traditional news outlets were covering the
story, to justify their expanded coverage. The press could also justify
covering what was initially defined as a private matter by focusing on
the issue of "lying to the public."
Nearly seven years later the Clinton presidency stood at the brink of
dissolution, rocked by another sex scandal and another controversial
Star(r) report - this time that of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr-
focusing on an alleged affair between President Clinton and a White
House intern named Monica Lewinsky. By the fall of 1998 all notions
that one could make clear-cut distinctions between serious and less
serious news outlets, even between news and nonnews genres, had been
effectively destroyed. Whether one started the day by listening to
National Public Radio or Howard Stern, watching Good Morning
America or CNN, reading the New York Times or the Star, the topic was
the same.' Viewers of daytime talk shows such as NBC's Leeza could
watch a panel- consisting of a Washington newspaper correspondent,
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a public relations expert who works with celebrities, a gossip columnist,
and a television star who had gone through a very public divorce -
discuss the way Hillary Clinton was handling the media spotlight. An
Internet search under the heading "Monica Lewinsky" would produce
over 12,000 options, ranging from breaking news reports to "the Monica
Lewinsky Fan Club." E-mails sharing the latest Clinton-Lewinsky jokes
were commonplace in offices around the country. The early evening
local and national news competed not only with each other, but with
the on-line Drudge Report (50,000 hits per day at the height of the
scandal, a large proportion of which were mainstream journalists them-
selves) and television tabloid shows like Entertainment Tonight, Hard
Copy, and A Current Affair (the latter two whose names had taken on
interesting double meanings) for the latest details and interpretations
of the scandal. Prime time dramas and comedies either made direct ref-
erences to the scandal, or their usual fare of sex, infidelity, power, and
conspiracy took on new meanings. Cable talk shows like Hardball and
Rivera Live, and all-news cable networks like MSNBC, became virtually
"all-Monica, all the time:' Late evening news was no different, to be fol-
lowed into the wee hours by more "discussion" of the scandal by news
anchor Ted Koppel; comedians Jay Lena, David Letterman, Bill Maher,
and Conan O'Brien; and crossover personalities like sportscaster-
turned-newscaster Keith Oberman. One could literally spend 24 hours
a day watching, listening to, and reading about the Clinton scandal.
More tellingly, one could do so without ever tuning in or picking up a
traditional news source.
Reflecting the ability of the new media to obliterate both time and
space, the story flowed across national borders, where it also crossed
genres and audiences. For example, while serious commentary in Israeli
newspapers focused on the impact of the scandal on prospects for a
Middle East peace settlement, commercials for spot removers on Israeli
television spoofed the scandal (private detectives searching Lewinsky's
closet are distressed to find a can of the advertiser's spot remover lying
next to "the" dress). Similarly, the scandal dominated the mainstream
British press and was also used in commercials to sell a newspaper's
weekly job listings (a Clinton impersonator asks his aide why he should
be interested in the new job listings, since he already has a job. After a
pause, he says, "Oh yeah, maybe I should take a look.").
It is obvious that any approach to political communication based
upon clear-cut distinctions between fact and opinion or public affairs
and entertainment is of little help in understanding the dynamics of
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media coverage of the Clinton sex scandals as they developed between
1992 and 1998. While there are a number of frameworks one might use
to attempt to make sense of this new world of mediated politics, two
concepts - hyperreality and multiaxiality - are particularly applicable.
HYPERREALITY. For Fiske (1996), the central unit of analysis in study-
ing the media (and the driving force in public discourse) is not objec-
tive reality, but "media events.'" According to Fiske,
The term media event is an indication that in a postmodern world
we can no longer rely on a stable relationship or clear distinction
between a "real') event and its mediated representation. Con-
seqnently, we can no longer work with the idea that the "real" is
more important, significant, or even "true" than the representa-
tion. A media event, then, is not a mere representation of what
happened, but it has its own reality, which gathers up into itself
the reality of the event that mayor may not have preceded it.
(Fiske 1996, p. 2)
The intertwining of an event and its mediated representation produces
what Baudrillard has called "hyperreality," and which Fiske defines as "a
postmodern sense of the real that accounts for our loss of certainty in
being able to distinguish clearly and hierarchically between reality and
its representation, and being able to distinguish clearly and hierarchi-
cally between the modes of its representation" (p. 62).
The Lewinsky-Clinton scandal is nothing if not hyperreal. The ques-
tions of fact in the case - did Clinton engage in sex with Lewinsky? Did
he lie about it? Did he commit perjury? - are inextricably tied to and
ultimately overshadowed by the representations of these issues -
Clinton's televised denial of sexual relations to the American public; the
barrage of interpretations by partisan pundits, lawyers, and comedians;
the nonstop release of rumors, leaks, and reports; the sounds and
images of private phone conversations and grand jury testimony. The
representation of these issues on the news, talk shows, and entertain-
ment programs all build on the same set of mediated facts but deploy
them in distinct ways. On other occasions these interpretations inter-
sect, as on shows like Politically Incorrect, where guests drawn from
entertainment, academia, politics, and the news media discuss contem-
porary issues like the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal.
These sometimes distinct, sometimes changing, and sometimes
intersecting genres blur any notions of a hierarchy between fact and
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fiction, or news and nonnews. For all the information available, and the
speed with which it is available (President Clinton received the Starr
report from Congress only an hour before the rest of the American
Public did), there is no consensus on the facts or their significance
because there is no longer a clear distinction between facts and their
representation. In a world in which we have the ability to use the science
of DNA testing to "prove" the occurrence of an event, but in which such
evidence has no guarantee of carrying any more authority than a come-
dian's satirical comment or a lawyer's definition of sex, what does it
mean to talk about the objective facts?1O
The hyperreality of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal is perhaps best
exemplified by recalling that it began as a result of an investigation of
a decades-old land deal. The intersection of Whitewater with Gennifer
Flowers, Paula Jones, Katherine Willey, Linda Tripp, and Monica
Lewinsky, as well as with the alleged misuse of FBI files and the firings
at the White House travel office was not illogical - one can certainly
reconstruct the connections between potential misuse of power, the
intimidation of witnesses, and so forth. But it was the dynamics of the
media environment that transformed these incidents into a media event
with its own complex and shifting meaning. In this hyperreal world, the
specific facts become mere vehicles for discussion of more deep-seated,
foundational issues about the human condition - political corruption,
public and private trust, sexual mores, workplace harassment, personal
relationships, and the like.
From this perspective, the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal was as much
rooted in events as diverse as Watergate, the political and cultural move-
ments of the 1960s, and the O. J. Simpson, Louise Woodward, and Jon-
Benet Ramsey trials, as in the Whitewater or Paula Jones cases. It was
also rooted in popular culture genres (films, television dramas and
comedies, novels, and music), which address many of the same foun-
dational issues. Sometimes these connections were obvious - terms like
"Whitewatergate," "Filegate," "Trave1gate," and "Fornigate" tied the
Clinton scandals to those of the Nixon administration and in doing so
tied the former to the long-standing public cynicism about government
the latter engenders. Films like Wag The Dog, Primary Colors, and An
American President, or television shows like Spin City - direct com-
mentaries on the contemporary state of politics - occasionally became
part of the discourse about the C1inton-Lewinsky scandal. For example,
when the United States bombed a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant that
was allegedly manufacturing chemical weapons, Kenneth Starr was
III
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asked by a reporter whether he had seen Wag The Dog (in which a fic-
tional president creates a fake war as a diversion from a sex scandal),
and if he saw any parallels. If he didn't, Saddam Hussein did: Earlier in
the year, Iraqi television broadcast a pirated copy of the movie at the
height of tensions over U.N. weapons inspections and u.s. threats to
launch air strikes. And an MSNBC story noted that a statement by Pres-
ident Clinton explaining his initial concerns over ordering the strike
sounded remarkably like one made by the fictional president in An
American President under similar circumstances.
Often, however, the connections between popular culture and the
Clinton scandal were more subtle, based on the similarity of the under-
lying issues, values, or beliefs that were tapped rather than on direct ref-
erences to contemporary politics. But this larger media environment,
even when it never made specific reference to the Clinton sex scandal,
was critically important in setting the context in which the scandal was
interpreted.
MULTIAXIALITY. To argue that the new media environment creates a
hyperreality in which reality and its representation begin to blur is not
to say that this process occurs outside the realm of politics. As Fiske
notes,
[public discourse] is language in social use; language accented
with its history of domination, subordination, and resistance;
language marked by the social conditions of its use and its users;
it is politicized, power-bearing language employed to extend or
defend the interests of its discursive community. (Fiske 1996, p. 3)
The hyperreality of postmodern media events does not change this, but
instead creates what Fiske calls multiaxiality "As hyperreality dissolves
stable categories of modes of representation, so multiaxiality transforms
any stability of categories into the fluidities of power" (p. 65).
While Fiske focuses on the core axes of class, race, and gender in his
discussion of public discourse, the concept of multiaxiality can be used
to better understand the changing nature of mediated political dis-
course more broadly. Traditionally, the political agenda has been shaped
by a symbiotic relationship between mainstream political actors and
major news outlets (Bennett 1988; Hallin 1986, pp. 115-119). In this
relationship, the media act as a monolithic gatekeeper, while a limited
set of political elites vie with each other to shape the agenda and how
it is framed. The public is reduced to the role of passive consumer,
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whose own attention to and interpretation of events is constrained by
this limited information environment.
This single axis system has been transformed in two ways. First,
the expansion of politically relevant media and the blurring of genres
leads to a struggle within the media itself for the role of authoritative
gatekeeper. And second, the expansion of media outlets and the oblit-
erating of the normal news cycle create new opportunities for non-
mainstream political actors to influence the setting and framing of the
political agenda.
The new media environment presents a challenge to mainstream
journalists in their roles of agenda setter and issue framer. It is telling
that throughout the Clinton sex scandals the mainstream press
frequently paused to reflect on is own role, and to try to clarify (for itself
and the public) what constitutes newsworthiness. l1 But the existence of
multiple news outlets (cable news or talk shows, radio call-in shows,
conservative publications like the American Spectator), quasi-news
outlets (Hard Copy, A Current Affair), entertainment media (The
Tonight Show, Late Night with David Letterman), and the Internet (e.g.,
The Drudge Report), all of which were in some sense covering the scan-
dals, made it difficult for either the mainstream press or political elites
to ignore or downplay them.
The impact of this multiaxial media environment can be seen in the
pattern of coverage that characterized the Paula Jones incident." While
mainstream coverage ebbed and flowed throughout most of i 994
(driven largely by events in the civil suit), and all but disappeared
throughout all of 1995 (as a result oflegal appeals that put much of the
case on hold), a number of alternative media outlets stuck consistently
to the story, keeping the issue firmly on this subterranean agenda.
It was not until 1997 that the Paula Jones issue became an ongoing
news story in the mainstream press) driven largely by events surround-
ing the civil suit and the increasingly inflammatory rhetoric coming
from both the Clinton and the Jones camps. While in some ways this
increased attention suggests that the mainstream news media had
recaptured control of the political agenda, most of the stories written
or aired during this period were initially generated through leaks,
reports, and rumors that first emerged over the Internet, from conser-
vative publications and the cable talk shows. Thus, while the main-
stream press had more firmly embraced the issue as newsworthy, it was
still reacting to an agenda thai was being framed largely by others.
Mainstream news sources like the evening news and the prestige news-
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papers were also disadvantaged by the collapse of the normal twice-a-
day news cycle and its rapid replacement with 24-hours-a-day breaking
news (Kurtz t998).
For all the attention generated by the Paula jones case, it paled in
comparison to the explosion of coverage that began with the allegation
in january 1998 of President Clinton's affair with a White House intern.
The last ten days of that month generated more newspaper stories
around the country than all the articles and commentaries written on
Gennifer Flowers and Paula jones combined. While journalists contin-
ued to periodically stop and reflect on whether this was a topic worthy
of so much attention, or to lament the decline in journalistic standards
in reporting, by 1998 the mainstream news media had essentially suc-
cumbed to the new system. Alternative media figures (most notably,
Matt Drudge) continued to indirectly shape mainstream media cover-
age, but also emerged as commentators or guests on serious news shows
like Meet the Press. At the same time, mainstream print journalists
and news reporters appeared with greater frequency on network and
cable talk shows, both a reflection of their increased celebrity and a con-
cession to the shifting balance of power in the media. Major publica-
tions like Newsweek, the New York Times, and the Washington Post
prepublished and updated their stories on the Internet, allowing the
public to see the normally hidden process of constructing the news.
Competing news outlets began to use each other - and in at least one
case indirectly used itself- as sources for their stories." The commen-
tary of comedians like jay Lena, David Letterman, Bill Maher, and AI
Franken occasionally became the topic of the next day's news stories,
while the day's news was increasingly the subject of that evening's
monologue.
In short, in the six-year period from the publication of the Star
expose to the publication of the Starr report, traditional journalism lost
its position as the central gatekeeper of the nation's political agenda. For
most of that period (arguably through 1997) the news media attempted
to play its traditional role and found that the political agenda was being
set without them. As a result it adapted to the new rules by increasingly
mimicking the form and substance of its new media competitors.
just as the new information environment created multiple axes of
power within the media, it also created new axes among the political
actors who shape the media's agenda. Authoritative sources have been
traditionally limited to a largely mainstream political, economic, and
social elite: elected officials, spokespersons for major interest groups,
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and so forth. These sources, while attempting to shape the media envi-
ronment in ways that would benefit their particular political agenda,
understood and largely operated within the rules of traditional jour-
nalism. But the new media environment, with its multiple points of
access and more continuous news cycle, has increased the opportuni-
ties for less mainstream individuals and groups to influence public dis-
course. This was certainly the case with the Clinton scandals.
While falling short of Hillary Clinton's claim of "a vast right-wing
conspiracy," the attacks on Bill Clinton's financial and sexual behavior
were orchestrated in large part by the religious and partisan far right.
Of particular interest to us is the way this traditionally marginalized
group effectively exploited the new media environment to create new
axes of power. l4 For example, when Gennifer Flowers first went public
with her affair, her contract with the Star was negotiated by John
Hudgens, an Arkansas businessman who had been press secretary to
two of Clinton's Republican challengers for governor. And it was Floyd
Brown (head of the independent Presidential Victory Committee that
produced the infamous "Willie Horton" political spot in 1988) who set
up the 900 number where callers could listen to excerpts from the taped
conversations between Clinton and Flowers. The Flowers affair was also
kept in the news when ultraconservative congressman Robert Dornan
read the entire Star expose into the Congressional Record while being
broadcast on C-Span.
In December 1993, the American Spectator, a conservative monthly
magazine, published the first reports that then Governor Clinton had
used state troopers to facilitate his rendevous with Flowers and other
women. The troopers' lawyer was Cliff jackson, a former Oxford class-
mate of Bill Clinton and more recent critic who had been the source of
the story about Clinton's draft dodging during the Vietnam war. It was
jackson who approached the American Spectator about doing the
"troopergate" story, which was then picked up first by CNN and then
by other major news outlets. Jackson also organized the 1994 news con-
ference (sponsored by the Conservative Political Action Conference) in
which Paula jones announced her intent to file a sexual harassment suit
against Clinton.
The Jones story was also initially kept in the news through conserv-
ative publications like the Washington Times and the National Review.
When the mainstream press failed to cover the story with enough vigor,
the conservative media watchdog group, Accuracy in Media, ran ads
in the Washington Post and the New York Times criticizing them for
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ignoring the issue. By this time Floyd Brown, now heading an organi-
zation called Citizens United, was acting as a clearinghouse for incrim-
inating information about Clinton and providing leads to conservative
G.O.P. congressional aides and reporters from both mainstream and
nonmainstream media. The religious right also played an important
role in maintaining the anti-Clinton media campaign. Jerry Falwell pro-
duced and distributed a video entitled Circles of Power, which "docu-
mented" a host of alleged ethical and moral violations of the President.
And television evangelist and one-time Republican presidential candi-
date Pat Robertson interviewed Paula Jones on his nationally televised
program.
Conservative groups found other creative ways to draw media atten-
tion to the Clinton scandals. In 1996 former EB.I. agent Gary Aldrich
published Unlimited Access, which alleged numerous (largely unsub-
stantiated) improprieties within the Clinton White House. In addition
to becoming a bestseller, which was released in paperback as the
Lewinsky scandal was at its peak, it was also given away free as an incen-
tive to join the Conservative Book Club. In 1997 the Free Congress Foun-
dation ran radio spots in Washington, D.C., offering to pay any "victims
of Bill Clinton" who would step forward and tell their story. And in that
same year Judicial Watch, headed by Larry Klayman, initiated a suit on
behalf of State Farm Insurance policyholders, alleging that the company
wrongly paid for some of President Clinton's legal bills as a result of a
personal liability policy he held. The suit allowed Klayman to depose a
number of Clinton administration people and ask about a wide range
of topics. Klayman then became a regular guest on a number of talk
shows such as Rivera Live, where he aired selected portions of the video-
taped depositions.
While garnering some support from mainstream conservatives and
Republicans, by and large this loosely knit network of conservative
foundations, public officials, private citizens, and media organizations
operated outside the normal chain of command. This was essentially an
insurgency movement that was able to influence the public agenda
through newly emerging axes of mediated political power. And though
generally failing in more traditional institutional settings (e.g., the
courts), they succeeded in influencing the political agenda byexploit-
ing the new media environment through first using the right wing press,
then the new media (the Internet, cable talk shows, etc.), and ultimately
the mainstream press. 15
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THE "PUBLIC" IN THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
The Clinton sex scandals provide a useful example of the blurring line
between media outlets and genres, and the challenge this presents for
traditional gatekeepers. But this case study raises a number of issnes as
well. Vvhile we think the evidence is strong that the new media envi-
ronment allowed nonmainstream conservative groups to set the media's
agenda, its impact on the public's agenda is much less obvious. Public
opinion polls throughout this period showed remarkably little move-
ment, and much of the movement that did occur was in the direction
of increased support for the president - exactly the opposite of what
traditional agenda-setting, framing, and priming theory would predict
(Zaller 1998).16
This stability could be interpreted as evidence that in the new media
environment, the "public" (collectively and as separate economic, polit-
ieal, and cultural communities) is free to construct its own interpreta-
tion of political reality. Opinion surveys and media-market analyses
suggest that the public followed the ongoing story (through a variety of
media) and knew the central issues and facts. Yet despite the efforts of
the President's supporters and detractors to frame the issue, a large
majority of the public created their own narrative that was consistent
with neither group's interpretation: The president had an affair and
lied about it to the public in his deposition and testimony (despite
his denials). This affair (and other allegations of sexual Inisconduct)
lowered their estimation of Clinton's already questionable moral char-
acter (despite his attempts to salvage his image). At the same time, and
in the face of concerted efforts by Clinton's detractors, the public con-
sistently separated this issue from his ability to govern, said that it was
ultimately a private matter, and opposed resignation or impeachment,
instead favoring either dropping the issue or imposing some form of
mild censure. Arguably, the ultimate resolution of the scandal (with the
significant exception of the President's impeachment) was closer to
the public's preferred outcome than that of either the President or his
opponents.
But there is another, less optimistic interpretation of these events and
public reaction to them. While Clinton ultimately remained in office,
his sexual infidelity (and his opponents' exploitation of this personal
failing) shaped a substantial part of the media's agenda for six years and
dominated it for another year; led to the impeachment of a popularly
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elected president for the first time in U.S. history; and turned both the
public's and the government's attention away from other, more sub-
stantive issues. And all this was done with maximum media attention
and minimal public response. From this perspective, the public's atten-
tion to this unfolding drama was no different than it might have been
to a particularly engrossing episode of ER, The X-Files, or The Jerry
Springer Show. In short, national politics had been reduced to a some-
times amusing, sometimes melodramatic, but seldom relevant
spectator sport l ?
Both of these interpretations of public reaction to the Clinton sex
scandals suggest that media events may playa greater role in setting the
public agenda than in framing it." But determining whether reaction
to such mediated events reflects an autonomous, reasoning public or
massive public indifference is crucial to understanding the current and
future state of democracy in the United States. We can offer no evidence
or argument for reaching such a determination. But we are convinced
that the answer lies in developing theories of mediated politics that are
more compatible with the fluidities of power emerging from the hyper-
real, multiaxial media environment in which we now live. We are also
convinced that developing such theories will require abandoning our
always artificial, but now almost certainly untenable, assumptions about
the distinction between news and entertainment media.
NOTES
1. The tendency to distinguish these roles reflects the general failure of liberal-demo-
cratic political theory to adequately address the complex relationship between
citizenship and consumption (what Miller [1998] calls the consumer-citizen
couplet). On this general issue, see Chaps. 5,6, and 7, by Underwood, Slater, and
Gandy, respectively.
2. In this regard we believe that the study of political communication has much to
learn from the theoretically rich approaches to these issues found in the cultural
studies literature.
3. Debates over the appropriate role of the media, citizens, and elites; attempts to dis-
tinguish between fact and opinion; efforts to define high and low culture; and the
other issues discussed in this section predate this period, of course. Our point is
that the first several decades of the twentieth century were particularly significant
in this regard, and shaped much of what we have come to treat as natural in the
current mediated political environment.
4. Many of these distinctions were formerly codified in the 1920s through the early
1950s by, among others, the Federal Radio (1927) and Federal Communications
(1934) Commissions; professional associations such as the American Society of
Newspaper Editors (1922), the National Association of Broadcasters (1923), and
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the Newspapers Guild (1933); the privately funded Commission on Freedom of the
Press (1947); and codes of conduct created by the movie (1930), radio (1937) and
television (1952) industries (Emery and Emery 1988; Peterson 1956).
5. Whether this "merging" of news and entertainment results in an actual change in
the form and content of both genres, or simply means that producers and con-
sumers of mediated messages treat this information differently is an empirical ques-
tion we do not address. Our strong suspicion (based on some initial research) is
that the content of the news has increasingly addressed issues of celebrity, culture,
and so forth, and presents information in a way that is more self-conciously enter-
taining. Entertainment media has always directly and indirectly addressed issues of
political and social import, so here the difference may be more in how this infor-
mation is interpreted and used (Delli Carpini and Williams 1994b). We suspect,
however, that even ostensibly entertainment genres are more likely (and able, given
new technology) to situate their story lines, etc., in real world events and issues.
6. The following discussion of media coverage of the Clinton sex scandals is based on
a systematic review of that coverage using Nexus and Internet searches, as well as
on an in-depth, though somewhat less exhaustive, review of broadcast and cable
coverage.
7. The blurring between news and entertainment is exemplified by the fact that the
National Enquirer's own reputation had been enhanced and begrudgingly acknowl-
edged by members of the mainstream press as a result of its reporting during the
O. J. Simpson trial.
8. In this regard, media coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal takes on charac-
teristics of "waves" as developed in Chap. II, by Wolfsfeld.
9. The concept of a media event has also been used by Dayan and Katz (1994). While
the two uses are similar in some ways (and share much in common with
Wolfsfeld's notion of "waves" in Chap. 11), there are several important differences.
For Fiske, media events provide opportunities for marginalized publics to enter
mainstream discourse by using such events to draw attention to their concerns
(much as the O. J. Simpson trial or Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings raised
broader issues of race and gender). For Dayan and Katz, however, media events
have the potential to tap into shared foundational beliefs that can unify seemingly
disparate segments of society: while various media may cover the event in differ-
ent ways, underlying assumptions about the public agenda are shared across both
outlets and audiences (as with the death of Princess Diana or the explosion of the
space shuttle). In our view the Clinton scandals come closer to Fiske's than Dayan's
and Katz's type of media event.
10. Of course, the DNA evidence did lead Clinton to finally acknowledge his sexual
relationship with Lewinsky, but had little discernible or lasting effect on public
opinion. Indeed, in the O. J. Simpson case, the science of DNA testing itself could
be challenged by further appeals to science, to beliefs in the corruption or inept-
ness of the police, and to inherent assumptions of racism, reducing this evidence
to the status of opinion at best, and even to "proof" that Mr. Simpson was being
set up, and thus was not guilty.
11. Recent attempts by the news media to "police" itself also point to this crisis in defin-
ing journalism: for example, the firing of several reporters and columnists at the
Boston Globe and Washington Post for inaccurate reporting, the resignation of a
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local newscaster in protest over the hiring of talk show host Jerry Springer, the deci-
sion by ABC to not air a docudrama by Oliver Stone about the downing of TWA
Flight 800 out of fear that it would confuse viewers, the ongoing criticism of"public
journalism" by mainstream members of the press, and so forth.
12. A similar pattern existed for coverage of the Gennifer Flowers scandal, though
shorter in duration.
13. One major news organization published what later turned out to be an erroneous
story on its Web site. The story was then picked up from the Web site by a com-
petitor, leading the first news organization to reaffirm the story using the second
organization's story as confirmation!
14. While in the case of the Clinton sex scandals it was conservative groups outside the
mainstream that were best able to exploit the new media environment, we make
no claims that this was the only possibility: In other circumstances and certainly
for other issues, very different groups could be equally successful.
15. The Republican losses in the 1998 congressional elections, resulting in part from
their failed strategy regarding the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal and the subsequent
meltdown within the G.O.P. leadership, suggest the extent to which established
elites within the party had lost control of their own agenda.
16. But see Keeter (1999) for an argument suggesting that political-science theories of
presidential approval may account for this pattern of stability and change.
17. The fact that the public's reaction to charges of sexual harassment in the Paula Jones
or Katherine Willey cases (or to alleged campaign finance violations by the Clinton-
Gore campaign) were similar to those expressed in the Monica Lewinsky case sup-
ports this rather pessimistic view. Perhaps more tellingly, the involvement of U.S.
military forces in Kosovo could not hold the public's attention at all.
18. Unexplored in this chapter is the impact of the new media environment in the
absence of an overriding media event. We suspect that under these quite common
circumstances the typical pattern may be a fracturing of the ability of the media or
political elites (mainstream or not) to even set an agenda that holds the attention
of anything like a majority of the public.
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